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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
ALEX MONTIEL,
Defendant/Petitioner.

:
:
:

Case No. 20030310-CA

.:

Case No. 20040780-SC

:

Petitioner is incarcerated.

INTRODUCTION
This Court should reverse the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Montiel.
2004 UT App 242, 95 P.3d 1216, cert, granted. 100 P.3d 220 (Utah 2004). Contrary to
the State's arguments, this Court should not address the issues of preservation or plain
error because they are not included in the issue on certiorari review. Moreover, this
Court should reverse because the trial court's stated policy of refusing to allow plea
reductions in cases involving firearms was a fixed policy that constituted a refusal to
properly exercise its discretion in assessing the appropriateness of the plea bargain.
Specifically, the trial court's stated policy caused it to fail to consider all legally relevant
factors, exceed the scope of its authority, and apply its discretion arbitrarily.
ARGUMENT
I

THIS COURT SHOULD NOT ADDRESS THE ISSUES OF
PRESERVATION OR PLAIN ERROR BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT
INCLUDED IN THE ISSUE ON CERTIORARI REVIEW

Rule 49 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure says n[o]nly the questions set

forth in the petition or fairly included therein will be considered by the Supreme Court."
Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4). This Court granted a writ of certiorari in this case "only as to
the following issue: Whether the district court's stated policy of refusing to allow plea
reductions in cases where a firearm had been used constituted a refusal to properly
exercise its discretion in assessing the appropriateness of the plea agreement." Order
dated October 27, 2004. This issue is limited and does not include the separate issues of
preservation or plain error. Id. Accordingly, this Court should only address the issue on
certiorari review: "Whether the district court's stated policy of refusing to allow plea
reductions in cases where a firearm had been used constituted a refusal to properly
exercise its discretion in assessing the appropriateness of the plea agreement," and should
not address the separate issues of preservation and plain error. Id.
This decision is appropriate because preservation and plain error were adequately
addressed below. On appeal, Montiel argued the trial court abused its discretion by
rejecting the plea agreement because its fixed policy caused it to fail to consider all
legally relevant factors, exceed the scope of its authority, and apply its discretion
arbitrarily. Montiel, 2004 UT App 242 at %l 1. Further, Montiel argued his issue was
preserved, but explained the court of appeals should reverse regardless of preservation
because the trial court's use of a fixed policy to reject the plea agreement constituted
plain error. Id In response, the State argued Montiel's issue was not preserved and the
plain error test was not met. Id The court of appeals affirmed because:

2

Although not crystal clear, the record in this case is sufficient
to support the State's argument that the trial court rejected the
plea agreement, not only because the underlying charge
involved the use of a firearm, but also because the court was
concerned that Defendant would receive too lenient a
sentence under the terms of the agreement and because the
victim had not been informed of the agreement.
MontieL 2004 UT App 242 at |17. Thus:
Because we have determined that these grounds are
legitimate reasons for rejecting the plea agreement, we
decline to further consider Defendant's challenge to the trial
court's rejection of the plea agreement. Specifically, we do
not address whether the trial court's stated policy regarding
charges involving use of a firearm, alone, would constitute an
abuse of discretion in rejecting the plea agreement.
IcL at ^[21. In other words, although the court of appeals did not specifically address
preservation or plain error, it put these issues to rest by essentially reaching the merits of
Montiel's argument and holding the "trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
rejected the plea agreement based on concerns that Defendant would receive too lenient a
sentence and that the victim had not been informed of the agreement." Id. at TJ19.
Besides, even if this Court concludes that the issues of preservation and plain
error were not adequately addressed by the court of appeals, then this Court should
decide the issue on certiorari and remand to the court of appeals for consideration of
preservation and plain error. Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4). By so doing, this Court will
allow the court of appeals to review the fully-briefed issues of preservation and plain

3

error in light of this Court's decision on certiorari and decide the case accordingly.1
n

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE MONTIEL BECAUSE THE
TRIAL COURT'S STATED POLICY OF REFUSING TO ALLOW
PLEA REDUCTIONS IN CASES INVOLVING FIREARMS
CONSTITUTED A REFUSAL TO PROPERLY EXERCISE ITS
DISCRETION

This Court should reverse Montiel because the trial court's stated policy of
refusing to allow plea reductions in cases involving firearms: (A) was a fixed policy, (B)
prevented the trial court from properly exercising its discretion in assessing the plea
agreement, and (C) prejudiced Montiel's case.
A.

The Trial Court's Stated Policy of Refusing to Allow Plea Reductions In
Cases Involving Firearms Was a Fixed Policy.
This Court defined the issue on certiorari review as, "Whether the district court's

stated policy of refusing to #llow plea reductions in cases where a firearm had been used
constituted a refusal to properly exercise its discretion in assessing the appropriateness of
the plea agreement." Order dated October 27, 2004. In accordance with this Court's
definition of the issue, Montiel argued in his opening brief that the trial court's stated
policy of refusing to allow plea reductions in cases involving firearms constituted a
refusal to properly exercise its discretion. Pet. Br. at 7-27. Specifically, he argued that

1

If this Court decides to address the issues of preservation and plain error,
Montiel asks this Court to grant supplemental briefing. This will allow him to
adequately present to this Court, as he presented to the court of appeals below, his
argument that the issue is preserved and that this Court should reverse regardless of
preservation because the trial court's error was plain.
4

the trial court's stated policy cause it to fail to consider all legally relevant factors, exceed
the scope of its authority, and use arbitrary judgment. Id.
The State responded that the trial court's stated policy of refusing to allow plea
reductions in cases where a firearm was used did not constitute a refusal to properly
exercise its discretion because the stated policy was not "truly" a fixed policy. Rspt. Br.
at 13-14. In support of this argument, the State does not assert that the trial court
considered the prosecutor's concerns about weak prosecutorial evidence or judicial
economy. Id. This is because the record is clear that the trial court's stated policy of
never waiving firearms enhancements caused it to ignore the prosecutor's concerns over
weak prosecutorial evidence and judicial economy. R. 200:4-5 (trial court rejecting
State's complaints that it did not have enough evidence to convict because, "Well, I don't
waive firearms enhancements, folks. You plead them, they're stuck unless I'm
convinced that there was some mistake in pleading," and rejecting defendant's judicial
economy argument because, "I don't care about judicial economy when people are
alleged to have used firearms").
Instead, the State claims the trial court's stated policy was not truly fixed because
before rejecting the plea agreement, the trial court addressed the "circumstances of the
crime as alleged in the information, [] the relationship between the alleged crime and the
penalty provided under the plea agreement, and whether the victim was aware of the
agreement." Rspt. Br. at 14. This argument, however, ignores the fact that the trial court

5

stated repeatedly that it would not allow plea reductions in cases where use of a firearm
was alleged. See R. 200:4-5 ("Well, I don't waive firearms enhancements, folks. You
plead them, they're stuck unless I'm convinced that there was some mistake in pleading1';
"I don't care about judicial economy when people are alleged to have used firearms";
"I'm not going to waive the firearms enhancement."). In other words, by the trial court's
own admission, it did not matter what issues were discussed. IcL. Unless "there was
some mistake in the pleading," there actually "wasn't a firearm," or the State's "witness
[was] lying," the trial court was not going to consider the proposed plea agreement. IdL.
The fixed nature of the trial court's policy is made amply clear by this case and
other appellate decisions reviewing this particular trial court's rulings. See, e.g., State v.
Gladney, 951 P.2d 247 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (trial court determined at plea colloquy that
it could not impose firearm enhancement because State did not charge, but later imposed
"zero to five years for firearms enhancement" anyway and ordered "sentences to run
consecutively"); State v. Candelario, 909 P.2d 277 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (after defendant
pleaded guilty to robbery, trial court "added an extra year to his sentence" as a firearm
enhancement, even though applicability of enhancement was questionable because
defendant only said he had firearm); State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469 (Utah Ct. App.
1991) (after defendant was charged with capital murder and convicted of manslaughter,
trial court sentenced defendant to "one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison, plus a
consecutive one to five year enhancement for use of a firearm," even though questionable

6

whether defendant received adequate notice of enhancement). Although these cases
were affirmed on appeal, they demonstrate this particular trial court's fixed policy in
never waiving firearms enhancements. Id.
Besides, contrary to the State's claims, the trial court did not consider the
circumstances of the alleged crime, the appropriateness of the penalty available under the
plea agreement, or the victim's awareness and concurrence in the plea agreement. Rspt.
Br. at 14. First, the State claims the trial court considered the circumstances of the case
because it read the charges and probable cause statement included in the information.
Rspt. Br. at 13-14. The trial court's statements about the information, however, are
interspersed with and connected to its statements that it would not waive firearms
enhancements. R. 200:4-5. Moreover, the trial court's statements about the information,
like the surrounding dialogue, focus almost entirely on the firearm and ignore the other
circumstances that might actually have assisted in determining the appropriateness of the
plea, such as the elements of the charged crime, Montiel's character and background, the
presentence report, the factual circumstances surrounding the case, the State's need for
the plea, and public policy. I d ; see State v. Sears, 542 S.E.2d 863, 867 (W. Va. 2000)
(holding trial court must determine, "in light of the entire criminal event and given the
defendant's prior criminal record[,] whether the plea bargain enables the court to dispose
of the case in a manner commensurate with the seriousness of the criminal charges and
the character and background of the defendant").

7

Second, the trial court did not consider the appropriateness of the penalty
available under the proposed plea. The State argues that the trial court's statement, "Zero
to five, what kind of a deal is that?" R. 200:6, "clearly" concerned the "discrepancy
between the alleged crime, the prosecutor's stated goal of ensuring that a dangerous man
was incarcerated, and the fact that the sentence allowed under the plea agreement did not
actually guarantee such incarceration." Rspt Br. at 14-15. Contrary to the State's claim,
however, the trial court could guarantee Montiel would be incarcerated under the plea
agreement. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(3) (2003) (explaining trial court may
sentence person convicted of third degree felony "for a term not to exceed five years").
Simply by not suspending Montiel's sentence, the trial court could ensure he would be
imprisoned until the Board of Pardons and Parole determined he was ready to be
released. Cf State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995) ("The Board is in a far better
position than a court to monitor a defendant's subsequent behavior and possible progress
toward rehabilitation while in prison and to adjust the maximum sentence accordingly.").
Thus, the trial court's concern was not that it could not ensure prison time but that the
prison time ensured was not enough. R. 200:4-5. As explained in Montiel's opening
brief, however, this concern of the trial court's did not reflect careful consideration of
any of the circumstances necessary to determine the appropriateness of the plea. Pet. Br.
at 17. It did not consider the elements of the charged crime, Montiel's character or
history, the facts alleged by the State, the circumstances surrounding the crime, the

8

State's need for the plea, or the appropriateness of the plea in light of public interest. I d .
Instead, it immediately followed and directly referenced the trial court's statements that it
would not waive firearms enhancements. Id.
Third, the trial court did not consider whether the victim was aware of or
approved of the plea agreement. The State argues the trial court must have considered
the victim's awareness and feelings simply because it raised the issue and the prosecutor
did not explain the victim's feelings after it interrupted the prosecutor's answer. Rspt.
Br. at 15. This conclusion, however, requires this Court to assume facts that are not in
the record. See, e.g., Tisco Intermountain & State Ins. Fund v. Industrial Comm'n, 744
P.2d 1340, 1342 (Utah 1987) (holding "it cannot be assumed that facts exist" in the
absence of evidence). The trial court could not have considered the victim's awareness
or feelings because it interrupted the prosecutor before the prosecutor had the
opportunity to tell what the victim knew or whether the victim approved of a plea like the
proposed agreement. See Pet. Br. at 18; R. 200:6-7. Rather, if any assumption is to be
drawn from the record, it is that the victim approved of the proposed plea agreement.
See State v. Casey, 2002 UT 29, 44 P.3d 756 (holding victim's right, "[u]pon request, to
be informed of, be present at, and to be heard at important criminal justice hearings"
extends to "change of plea hearing[s]" and "must be 'protected'" (citations omitted)).
R

The Trial Court's Stated Policy Prevented the Trial Court From Properly
Exercising Its Discretion In Assessing the Plea Agreement
The State only addresses the merits of Montiel's argument under a plain error
9

analysis, arguing the trial court's abuse of discretion was not obvious. Rspt. Br. at 23-39.
As stated above, plain error is not the proper analysis because preservation and plain
error are not included in the issue on certiorari review. See supra Part I. Regardless,
Montiel replies to the State's arguments as follows.
1.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing to Consider All Legally
Relevant Factors.
This Court has said a trial court abuses its discretion if it "fails to consider all

legally relevant factors." State v. McCovev. 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990). Because
Utah law has not specifically defined what factors are legally relevant, Montiefs
argument relies on case law from other jurisdictions for guidance. Pet. Br. at 9 n.2; see
Arndt v. First Interstate Bank of Utah . 1999 UT 91,1(17, 991 P.2d 584 (noting if Utah
case law "is not determinative,1' then court must look to ncase law from other
jurisdictions for guidance"); State v. Galvan. 2001 UT App 329,lfl2, 37 P.3d 1197
(turning to "other jurisdictions [that] have decided similar cases" because matter of first
impression in Utah). In response, the State suggests case law from other jurisdictions is
not helpful because "courts vary widely in the discretion they grant trial courts." Rspt.
Br. at 26. To support its argument, the State notes that some jurisdictions do not require
a trial court to consider plea agreements or to state its reasons for rejecting a plea
agreement. Rspt. Br. at 26-27 (citing United States v. Moore. 637 F.2d 1194, 1196 (8th
Cir. 1981): United States v. Jackson. 563 F.2d 1145. 1148 (4 th Cir. 1997); United States
v. Bean. 564 F.2d 700, 703 n.3 (5 th Cir. 1977); State v. DeClue. 805 S.W.2d 253, 256
10

(Mo. Ct. App. 1991)). Because these cases differ from Utah in that they do not require
trial courts to consider all legally relevant factors before rejecting a plea agreement, they
are obviously not helpful in establishing what legally relevant factors a trial court must
consider before rejecting a plea. IdL.
Instead, this Court should look for guidance in jurisdictions that, like Utah,
require a trial court to consider the circumstances of a plea before rejecting it. See Pet.
Br. at 10-19. Of these jurisdictions, one relevant factor is universally applied—the trial
court must exercise sound discretion, meaning it must consider the plea under the
circumstances of the case before rejecting it. See. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,
262 (1971) (holding "court may reject a plea in exercise of sound judicial discretion");
State v. Turner. 980 P.2d 1188, 1189-90 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (holding Utah courts
"review a trial court's acceptance or rejection of a guilty plea under an abuse of
discretion standard"); Black's Law Dictionary 479 (7 th ed. 1999) (defining judicial
discretion as the "exercise of judgment by a judge or court based on what is fair under
the circumstances and guided by the rules and principles of law").2

2

See, e.g.. United States v. Jeter. 315 F.3d 445, 447-48 (5 th Cir. 2002) (holding no
abuse because could not assume state would prosecute and too lenient under guidelines
and circumstances); United States v. Torres-Echavarria, 129 F.3d 692, 696-97 (2d Cir.
1997) (holding no abuse because plea "inadequately reflected" seriousness and
undermined guidelines, and leniency previously encouraged defendant to violate law);
United States v. Greener. 979 F.2d 517, 520-521 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding no abuse
because court "closely examined" plea and "actual offense behavior" and concluded
agreements would "significantly undermine" statutory purposes of sentencing); United
States v. Fov. 28 F.3d 464, 473 (5th Cir. 1994) (remanding, even though court's
11

In other words, a trial court cannot reject a plea based on a fixed policy. See
United States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1439 (10th Cir. 1995) ("In our judgement,
rejecting a plea implicating both branches of government solely out of concern for the

statements indicated it rejected plea as "too lenient," because it ultimately rejected plea
"in material part, on an improper basis, namely, [defendant's] repetition of the position
he took at the Rule 11 hearing that he was not involved with cocaine distribution");
United States v. Severino, 800 F.2d 42, 46-47 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding no abuse to reject
for no factual basis); United States v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454, 1458 (10 th Cir. 1985)
(holding no abuse to reject because plea prevented prosecution for fraud and severely
limited fines); People v. Jasper, 17 P.3d 807, 812 (Colo. 2001) (holding court must
exercise "independent judgement in" each case); Daniels v. State, 453 N.E.2d 160, 165
(Ind. 1983) (holding no abuse because court considered evidence, was aware of victim's
feelings, recognized arranging plea took time and effort, and was concerned with
respecting statute); Stacks v. State, 372 N.E.2d 1201, 1207 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978) (holding
court must evaluate "circumstances" of case and decide propriety of "particular bargain")
State v. Clanton, 612 P.2d 662, 665 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980) ("[Judicial discretion implies
the liberty to act as a judge should act, applying the rules and analogies of the law to the
facts found after weighing and examining the evidence."); Hoskins v. Maricle . 150
S.W.3d 1, 25 (Ky. 2004) (holding no abuse where court rejected plea after heard
evidence in first trial and from victims' families/friends, and concluded agreement "too
lenient"); People v. Grove, 566 N.W.2d 547, 557 (Mich. 1997) (holding court may reject
if plea is "'too light a sentence under the circumstances'" (citation omitted)); State v.
Brown, 689 N.W.2d 347, 353 (Neb. 2004) (holding no abuse because agreement did not
meet court-imposed deadline and defendant made no "reasonable effort" to reach
agreement before deadline); Sparks v. State, 759 P.2d 180, 184 (Nev. 1988) (holding
court must consider "fairness" to defense and prosecution, and protection of court's
"sentencing authority"); State v. Southworth, 52 P.3d 987, 997 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002)
(same as Grove); State v. Hines, 919 S.W.2d 573, 578 (Tenn. 1995) (holding no abuse
because court found facts, even with mitigating circumstances, "should be decided by a
jury"); State v. Hunt, 485 A.2d 109, 113-14 (Vt. 1984) (holding discretion requires "'due
regard for that which is right and equitable under the circumstances, and directed by
reason and conscience to a just result.'" (citations omitted)); State v. Reuschel. 312 A.2d
739, 743 (Vt. 1973) (holding plea "should not be refused without good reason"); Sears ,
542 S.E.2d at 867 (holding court must consider in light of "entire criminal event" and
given defendant's criminal record, whether plea reflects seriousness of charges and
defendant's character/background).
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district court's scheduling is, under the facts of this case, impermissible."); Hockadav v.
United States, 359 A.2d 146, 148-49 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding "trial court must identify
good reasons for" rejecting plea and "blanket refusal to hear from either side concerning
the proffered plea constituted an abuse of discretion" (citations omitted)); State v. Hager,
630 N.W.2d 828, 833, 837 (Iowa 2001) (holding discretion to reject "is broad but not
unlimited" and "refusing to consider the terms of the plea agreement solely because it
was presented after the deadline" was abuse). As explained by the Ninth Circuit:
Rule 11 permits district courts to assess the wisdom of plea
bargains; this grant of power carries with it the duty to
exercise it responsibly. When a court establishes a broad
policy based on events unrelated to the individual case before
it, no discretion has been exercised. When dealing with
issues as fundamental as a person's freedom or imprisonment,
our judicial system can-and must-give every case
independent consideration.
United States v. Miller, 722 F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 1983).
Although the State claims that some jurisdictions allow trial courts to reject plea
agreements based on fixed policies, neither of the two cases cited by the State stand for
that proposition. Rspt. Br. at 27 (citing United States v. Gamboa. 166 F.3d 1327, 1331
(11th Cir. 1999); Jasper, 17 P.3d at 812). First, in Gamboa, the trial court rejected the
plea agreement because it "did not adequately reflect the seriousness of the offenses," it
was "unacceptable" under the Sentencing Guidelines, "the facts would not support" the
pleas, "the pleas were tendered after" the court-imposed deadline, and the court-imposed
deadline provided sufficient time for bargaining. Gamboa, 166 F.3d at 1330. The
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appellate court reviewed each of these reasons and determined the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in rejecting the plea agreement. Id. at 1330-31, 1331 n.4. Second, in
Jasper, the trial court rejected a plea agreement offered the morning of trial because the
agreement was presented after the court-imposed deadline. Jasper, 17 P.3d at 812. The
appellate court affirmed because the trial court must be allowed to reject plea agreements
on procedural grounds where necessary to manage its caseload. IdL at 812-13. The court
was careful to explain, however, that when considering "a plea agreement on the merits,"
a trial court "may not reject a plea arbitrarily" and must exercise "independent judgement
in deciding" each case. Id. at 811-12. Thus, this Court should reverse because the trial
court did not consider all legally relevant factors in Montiel's case, but rejected the plea
based on its fixed policy to never waive firearms enhancements. R. 200:4-7; see. Pet. Br.
at 10-19.
2.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Exceeding the Limits Prescribed
By Law.
This Court has said a trial court abuses its discretion if it "exceeds the limits

prescribed by law." State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66,^66, 52 P.3d 1210. While it is clear that
Utah law requires a trial court to exercise discretion by individually considering each
plea agreement under the circumstances of each case, Utah law has not yet defined the
scope of a trial court's discretion to reject a plea agreement. Pet. Br. at 9 n.2. Thus,
Montiel's argument relies on case law from other jurisdictions for guidance. See Arndt
1999 UT 91 at 1J17 (noting if Utah case law "is not determinative," then court must look
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to "case law from other jurisdictions for guidance"); Galvan, 2001 UT App 329 at f 12
(turning to "other jurisdictions [that] have decided similar cases" because matter of first
impression in Utah). Contrary to the State's claim, the case law cited by Montiel does
not eliminate the trial court's discretion. Rspt. Br. at 32; see, e.g.. United States v.
Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding trial court may reject plea
agreements according to its "reasoned exercise of discretion"). Rather, these cases
recognize the trial court's discretion to look at the circumstances of a case and decide the
appropriateness of a plea agreement, but also recognize the State's right to prosecute and
the prosecutor's superior ability to "evaluate the government's prosecution resources and
the number of cases it is able to prosecute." Ammidown, 497 F.2d at 621; see Robertson,
45 F.3d at 1438 ("Courts do not know which charges are best initiated at which time,
which allocation of prosecutorial resources is most efficient, or the relative strengths of
various cases and charges." (citations omitted)). Thus, these cases conclude trial courts
"should avoid creating broad rules that limit traditional prosecutorial independence."
Miller, 722 F.2d at 565.
This reasoning directly comports with Utah's concern in preventing trial courts
from using their discretion to "nullify[] the State's right to prosecute." Turner, 980 P.2d
at 1190; see Utah Const. Art. V, Sec. 1 ("The powers of the government of the State of
Utah shall be divided into three distinct departments,... and no person charged with the
exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any
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functions appertaining to either of the others.1'); Rspt. Br. at 32 (recognizing "'decision to
indict, allege specific charges, or dismiss charges is inherently an exercise of executive
power."1 (citations omitted)). Accordingly, Utah, like other jurisdictions that protect the
State's right to prosecute, should prohibit trial courts from creating n[c]ategorical
limitations" that "force prosecutors to bring charges they ordinarily would not, or to
maintain charges they would ordinarily dismiss as on-going investigations uncover more
information." Miller, 722 F.2d at 565; see United States v. Maddox. 48 F.3d 555, 558
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding "judge must provide a reasoned exercise of discretion in order
to justify a departure from the course agreed on by the prosecution and defense");
Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1439 ("[Rejecting a plea implicating both branches of government
solely out of concern for the district court's scheduling is, under the facts of this case,
impermissible."); United States v. Noble, 653 F.2d 34, 36 (1 st Cir. 1981) (noting case
where plea reached to ease impact of conviction distinguishable from Ammidown
because, "This is not a case where acceptance of the plea agreement is both reasonable
and necessary to secure a legitimate and important prosecutorial interest"); Pet. Br. at 2021 (citing additional cases).
Besides, even if this Court does not follow the reasoning delineated by Montiel's
cases, this Court should still reverse because the trial court exceeded the scope of its
authority even under the test proposed by the State. The cases cited by the State say
,f

'[p]lea bargains . . . go to the traditionally judicial function of determining what penalty
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to impose.'" Rspt. Br. at 34 (citations omitted). Thus, a trial court "'possesses] broad
latitude to evaluate'" a proposed plea agreement and "reject the agreement if the court
believes the defendant would receive too light a sentence under it." IcL. at 35 (citations
omitted). In this case, the trial court did not evaluate the case at all, let alone reject the
plea based on a belief that the sentence would be too light. See Pet. Br. at 15-19. Rather,
the trial court rejected the plea agreement based on its fixed policy to never waive
firearms enhancements. IdL
3.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Applying Its Discretion
Arbitrarily.
This Court has said a trial court abuses its discretion if it applies its discretion

arbitrarily. See State v. Chambers, 533 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975). First, the State
argues the trial court did not act arbitrarily in this case because it "imposed limitations on
its policy." Rspt. Br. at 37. The "limitations" referenced by the State are the trial court's
statements that it would not "waive firearms enhancements . . . unless I'm convinced that
there was some mistake in pleading," or "[ujnless you can tell me you don't have any
evidence^] that he didn't have a firearm or there wasn't a firearm or your witness is
lying." R. 200:4-5. Contrary to the State's claim, however, these statements were not
limitations that served to make the trial court's fixed policy less arbitrary. In general, if
there is a mistake in the information or there is no evidence to support the charges, the
prosecution will not reach the plea agreement phase. See State v. Hawatmeh. 2001 UT
51 ,^[15, 26 P.3d 223 (holding at preliminary hearing, "'the prosecution must present
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sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and
that the defendant committed it'" (citations omitted)). In this case, the State made clear
there was no mistake in the information and there was some evidence to support the
charges. R. 200:4-5. Instead, it was entering the plea agreement because the evidence
was too weak to present to a jury, the plea encouraged judicial economy, and it felt a
societal duty to ensure Montiel was incarcerated. Id. at 4-7. Accordingly, the trial
court's statement that it would only consider waiving a firearms enhancement if there
was a mistake in the information or no evidence to support the charge was simply a
restatement that it would not waive firearms enhancements. See id.
Second, the State argues the trial court's policy was not arbitrary because it
"related directly to the crime charged and whether the sentence allowed .. . was
commensurate to that crime." Rspt. Br. at 37; see kL at 22-23. Contrary to the State's
argument, the trial court's fixed policy was not to consider the crime charged (including
its circumstances, the history and character of the defendant, and public policy) and to
determine whether the sentence allowed under the plea was commensurate to that crime.
R. 200:4-7. Instead, the trial court's policy was to look at the information to see if use of
a firearm was alleged and, if so, refuse to accept any plea that waived the firearms
enhancement, regardless of the appropriateness of the plea under the facts and
circumstances of the case. Id.
Third, the State argues the trial court's fixed policy was not arbitrary because it

18

gave "proper respect to the legislature's desire to more severely punish those who use
dangerous weapons." Rspt. Br. at 37 (citation omitted); see id at 22-23. This argument
ignores the fact that the trial court's stated policy applies to all cases where use of a
firearm is alleged. R. 200:4-5. For example, in this case, use of a firearm was merely a
charge—it was not yet proved beyond a reasonable doubt, it was not conceded in the
proposed guilty plea, and, as admitted by the prosecution, it was not supported by strong
evidence. See Pet. Br. at 26 n.5. By enacting the firearms enhancement statute, the
Legislature did not intend to more severely punish people who have not been found
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of using a firearm. See. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203
(Supp. 2002) (firearms enhancement statute explaining in amendment notes that "2000
amendment, effective March 14,2000,... added 'beyond a reasonable doubt'
throughout the section"); Apprendi v. New Jersey. 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) ("Other
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.").
C.

This Court Should Reverse Because Montiel Was Prejudiced By the Trial
Court's Abuse of Discretion.
The State claims the proper test to determine prejudice where a trial court rejects a

plea agreement is whether the defendant "'took any action in reliance on the tentative
plea agreement' that 'would substantially affect' his trial." Rspt. Br. at 38-39 (quoting
State v. Stringham. 2001 UT App 13,ffi[15-16, 17 P.3d 1153). However, in Stringham ,
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this test was applied not to determine whether the defendant was prejudiced by the trial
court's rejection of a plea but by his reliance on a plea that was never presented to the
trial court for consideration and that the trial court was later "unwilling to compel the
State to honor." See Stringham, 2001 UT App 13 at f 15 (citing State v. Moss. 921 P.2d
1021, 1027 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)). Similarly, in Moss, this test was applied not to
determine whether the defendant was prejudiced by the trial court's rejection of a plea
but by his reliance on a plea that was illegally accepted. See Moss, 921 P.2d at 1027. In
both of these cases, the defendants argued they were prejudiced by reliance on pleas they
were not legally entitled to. See Stringham, 2001 UT App 13 at ^[15; Moss, 921 P.2d at
1027. Accordingly, the test for prejudice necessarily measured their reliance on the
unattainable pleas rather than on the erroneous denial of the pleas. Id.
Alternatively, in this case, Montiel's plea agreement was legal and was agreed to
by the State. R. 200:4. In other words, his prejudice resulted not from mistakenly
relying on a plea he could not legally receive, but by being denied the opportunity to
enter a legal plea simply because the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting the plea
based on a fixed policy. Id. at 4-7. Accordingly, the test to determine if Montiel was
prejudiced is whether, "[b]y proceeding with trial," he was "exposed to a greater possible
punishment than that which could have resulted from his guilty pleas." Hockaday, 359
A.2d at 149; see Maddox, 48 F.3d at 560 (same); United States v. Delegal. 678 F.2d 47,
52 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding argument that defendant was not prejudiced was "baseless"

20

because he was "convicted of two counts" after the trial court rejected his plea to one
count); c£ United States v. Shepherd. 102 R3d 558, 563 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("Although
'prejudice is more readily apparent where the rejection of the plea leads to conviction of
a greater offense than that offered in a plea agreement/ prejudice may still exist when the
defendant is ultimately convicted of the same offenses to which she attempted to plead
guilty." (citations omitted)). Thus, because Montiel was forced to go to trial for an
enhanced first degree felony rather than pleading guilty to a third degree felony, he was
prejudiced by the trial court's abuse of discretion. R. 172-73; 200:4; 201-03.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the court of appeals' decision in State v. Montiel. 2004
UT App 242, and withdraw Montiel's conviction because the trial court abused its
discretion by rejecting the plea agreement.
SUBMITTED this a r & day of April, 2005.

tfdkf J. sEPPr
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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